Technological ethics in university-industry partnerships: The best of both worlds? by Thompson, Paul B.
Broadly conceived, ethics is the study and review of whether any given practice is good 
or bad, right or wrong, justifiable or unjustifiable in a given set of circumstances. NaBC 
8 has explored a number of practices for linking scientific research with private enter-
prise. The fact that conferences are being held to explore ways to do this suggests that 
somebody thinks that this is a good thing to do. an ethical analysis of establishing closer 
ties between academic researchers and commercial technology providers needs to delve 
into those reasons and subject them to some critical discussion.
The current opinion and analysis on whether such partnerships are justifiable tends to 
make one of two framing assumptions. On one side, there is the view that society needs 
more efficient ways to deliver the benefits of publicly funded research to the public that 
funded it. Here, better (which usually means more extensive) linkages between academics 
and industry are promoted with the idea that for-profit firms are best able to make scientific 
discovery available for public use and consumption. This point of view led to the passage 
of the Bayh-Dole act (PL 96-57) in 980 and has been articulated explicitly as the basis 
for linking university research to state and national economic development.
On the other side is the view that science should be separated from profit-seeking tech-
nology development. Some people who hold this view prefer socialist political schemes and 
presume that pursuit of profit is intrinsically problematic. Others who make this criticism 
make one of two arguments to support the more subtle view that while capitalism is a 
legitimate form of society, some aspects of science should be isolated from capital. One 
argument stresses the public’s need for unbiased sources of information and expertise in 
order to bring about democratic governance, and interprets links between public-sector 
research and venture-capital investment as compromising the ability of university, gov-
ernment and non-profit scientific research to fill this need (Krimsky, 003). The other 
argument stresses the need for public disclosure and reproducibility within the research 
process itself. This view suggests that pressures to seek commercializable results and the 
secrecy that accompanies proprietary technology will ultimately lead to the weakening 
of science as a knowledge-seeking social institution (Busch et al., 99).
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While I am certainly willing to undertake the task of pursuing these assumptions to 
some degree, I want to suggest a somewhat different way to focus our deliberations. Let me 
begin with a bold conjecture, one for which I can offer no data and that will be contrary 
to the biases of many people: technological ethics are today better served in the private 
sector than in the universities. If my conjecture is correct, university/industry partnerships 
could have the result of improving the capacity for university-based science to address 
ethical issues, if they bring some of the norms and practices that are commonplace in 
the private sector into the university. Or they could have the result of transferring the 
relatively weak performance of university science to the private sector. While we can 
hope for the better outcome, my conjecture is that university/industry partnerships are 
likely to produce the worse one. But first I must say a bit more about what I mean by 
technological ethics.
What Is technological Ethics?
although there is no widespread consensus on what technological ethics involves, I am 
thinking about proposals made by the philosopher Hans Jonas in the 970s and 980s. 
Jonas began by making two very straightforward observations. First, he noted that the 
nature, rate and scope of technological innovation had been gradually increasing for at 
least 00 years. By the time that Jonas wrote his original German text some 30 years 
ago, it was no longer plausible to think that changes in technology could be treated as 
something like an act of God: relatively rare and beyond the ability of human beings 
to contemplate. Instead, Jonas argued that that technology had reached a point where 
humanity could and should engage in deliberate choices about the future direction that 
technical innovation should take (Jonas, 984).
Jonas was not suggesting that we have the ability to predict the future in detail, nor 
was he suggesting that we could determine the likely social or ecological impacts that 
would follow from discoveries in basic science. Instead, he was saying that cumulative 
experience with technical change and our increasing ability to model and forecast social 
and ecological trends establish a basis for social decision-making about which specific 
technologies to develop and implement, as well as how to regulate technological risk. I 
have often heard scientists object to this proposal by saying that it is just not possible to 
project the consequences of a scientific discovery. But Jonas was not claiming an ability 
to foresee the consequences of technological innovation that exceeds foresight commonly 
exercised by private firms and venture capitalists, who routinely do make decisions about 
which technologies to develop and implement. 
If there is anything truly controversial in Jonas’s observation, it is that there should be 
social decision-making about the ends-in-view that guide such choices. This is a point 
Technological ethics are today better served in the private sector 
than in the universities.
00 agricultural Biotechnology: Economic Growth Through New Products, Partnerships and Workforce Development
that I will, of necessity, leave somewhat undeveloped in the balance of my remarks. I 
accept the validity of allowing capital markets to suffice for some forms of social decision-
making. Nevertheless, I also endorse the need for deliberative public and quasi-public 
forums in which constituencies excluded from capital markets can have a voice. Further 
specification of the means for social decision-making is one of the key problems in tech-
nological ethics. 
Jonas’s second observation concerns the nature of ethics. He claims that our current 
understanding of responsibility remains trapped in the village mentality of the eighteenth 
century. I believe that he has several related points in mind. Most importantly, we work 
with a conception of moral agency that presumes individually initiated actions having 
impacts that are limited to village-sized temporal and spatial scales. In fact, the acts that 
need to be brought under an ethic of responsibility are seldom initiated by a single indi-
vidual. They are the cumulative and corporate result of many people acting in organized 
fashion, often under the guidance of corporate decision-making structures. When I use 
the word “corporate” here, I do not necessarily mean multi-national or even business 
corporations. The point calls attention to organized, coordinated and at least partially 
controllable forms of collective action, as distinct from mob rule or the purely coincidental 
cumulative consequences of people acting in haphazard fashion (French, 984).
Modern technology development may not be orchestrated or bureaucratically governed 
in its details, but it is not haphazard. Practices of peer review in the applied sciences, tenure 
and promotion in universities, and grant-making by government and foundations join 
with somewhat bureaucratically controlled forms of r&D to generate a truly corporate 
form of action. Furthermore, these corporate acts involve the development and dissemina-
tion of new technology with spatial consequences that are global, affecting many people 
who are entirely unknown and even unknowable to the actors. as such, a conception of 
ethics that is grounded in personal loyalties based on face-to-face reciprocity established 
among neighbors and townsmen is increasingly inadequate. In addition, effects may be 
cumulative and latent, affecting people in the distant future. traditional ethics was keyed 
to forms of action where impacts would be felt by people known to one another within a 
time-frame that allowed one to link cause and effect in rather intuitive fashion.
Jonas’s point was that our working notion of ethical responsibility is simply out of sync 
with this new reality. While people of today may have the same desire to be ethically re-
sponsible as people in the past, the functional outcome of acting according to norms that 
emphasize personal loyalty and reciprocity is not the same as what it was in the past. 
On the one hand, technological ethics is the organized and thoughtful exercise of 
foresight and deliberative choice in selecting projects for applied science and technical 
innovation. This involves utilizing the limited but hardly inconsequential powers of fore-
sight we possess in an effort to innovate and validate new ethical understandings capable 
of guiding our technology. On the other hand, technological ethics is an effort in public 
scholarship aimed at understanding and addressing the conceptual, organizational and 
practical obstacles encountered in making such choices.
as an academic philosopher, I see myself working in this tradition of public scholarship. 
While predictive power is clearly one aspect of technological ethics, the philosophical 
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piece involves our understanding of fairly basic ideas such as “action,” “responsibility,” 
and “democracy,” as well as a more explicitly articulated vision of the future that we col-
lectively desire. Different conceptualizations of these basic elements can lead to striking 
differences in the way that one characterizes risk and risk-management. as such, there is 
always opportunity to discuss and debate how risks should be characterized in a given case, 
and such debates have been the main substance of technological ethics for agricultural 
biotechnology, (Thompson, 997, 003).
Ethics in Industry and University Settings
My bold conjecture is that scientists, engineers and business leaders working in the private 
sector have done a much better job of implementing technological ethics as a practical 
activity than have scientists, engineers and administrators in universities and public-sector 
laboratories. rather than pretending to have data that support this conjecture, I will make 
a brief conceptual argument to illustrate why I think this is the case. One element of this 
argument stresses the nature of private enterprise and the working environment created 
within for-profit firms, while the other describes the milieu and culture of university 
science and engineering departments.
The argument in favor of thinking that people in the private sector do in fact undertake 
the practical deliberations involved in technological ethics to some degree is fairly simple. 
First, they are human beings and as such are motivated by the same desires to act ethically 
and to be seen favorably as all human beings. Historically, people in business have aimed 
to market products and services that people want and need, and to encourage growth and 
prosperity in the communities in which they do business and reside. In short, they intend 
their business activities to have effects in these communities, and such intentions are a 
locus of moral responsibility. Second, the need to gain market acceptance for the goods 
and services that a business offers, and to have a reputation for quality and reliability, 
provides a reinforcing incentive for profit-seeking firms to act in an ethical manner. I see 
no reason to think that people engaged in business are particularly inclined to dismiss 
or belittle ethical responsibilities simply because they are in business, and every reason 
to think that they would like to conduct their business affairs, including and especially 
those involving technical innovations, in an ethically responsible manner. 
There are, of course, scam operations that are completely unethical, and they tarnish 
the very idea of business, but it is important to note that scams are not really business 
activities at all. Well known structural elements in innovation and profit-seeking enterprise 
can constrain the ability of legitimate businesses to fulfill ideals of technological ethics, as 
Scientists, engineers and business leaders working in the private 
sector have done a much better job of implementing technological 
ethics as a practical activity than have scientists, engineers and 
administrators in universities and public-sector laboratories.
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well. The most important structural tension for present purposes arises when a product 
or manufacturing process is seen to have unwanted health or environmental impacts 
well into the cycle of product development, sometimes long after products have been 
marketed and utilized by the public. In such situations, the economic incentive switches 
from being ethical to being secretive and avoiding losses. The chemical and pharmaceuti-
cal industries have been especially plagued by well-publicized incidents from thalidomide 
and Love Canal to Erin Brockovich and Vioxx®. Such incidents reinforce public cynicism 
about the private sector’s commitment to ethics, but they also reinforce the incentives for 
technological ethics early in the cycle of product development.
as such, I am content to leave my argument with the claim that for-profit enterprises 
have incentives to engage in technological ethics and that the people working in these 
firms are motivated to act ethically. I do believe that the private sector has not been as 
assiduous in utilizing or encouraging public scholarship in technological ethics as it 
should be, mainly because there is an attempt to rely on the kind of village ethics that 
Jonas critiques so ably. But that is a matter to which I will return later. The other point 
that I must make to establish my larger claim is that, quite contrary to those who see 
university-based science as contributing to democratic governance of science and technol-
ogy, university science departments have actually not been very good places to pursue 
technological ethics at all.
The conceptual argument for this claim is that the incentives in university science and 
engineering departments are organized around publications, grantsmanship and patents. 
While university scientists are human beings, they do not really intend that their research 
will have immediate impacts on the communities in which they work and reside, and it 
is very easy for them to assume that any ethical questions associated with their research 
will be dealt with by someone else at some other time. These basic incentives of univer-
sity research have been reinforced by a positivist philosophy of science which holds that 
statements about values or ethics cannot be subjected to the same standards of validity 
as statements reporting data or relationships among data, and, as such, have no place in 
the professional activities of the working scientist. While the hold that this philosophy 
has over working scientists has weakened significantly over the last 5 years, it continues 
to provide an obstacle to the practical discussions and deliberations characteristic of tech-
nological ethics within the environment of academic science departments, and especially 
within the training and education of scientists. 
Paul rabinow’s study of the biotechnology industry, Making PCR, shows that many 
molecular biologists in the 980s and 990s chose industry careers over academic careers 
precisely because they saw university science departments as incompatible with their values 
University scientists do not really intend that their research will 
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and resistant to change. The subjects interviewed for this study describe academic science 
as competitive and obsessed with egotistic gratification and career advancement. They 
chose industry because the work environment was more cooperative and was dedicated 
to science in pursuit of environmental and public-health values they held dear. rabinow’s 
informants also describe biotechnology companies as more accepting of women and 
minorities than were university science departments (rabinow, 996).
There are, of course, many exceptions to these generalizations among individual scien-
tists. I have personally found many molecular biologists and agricultural scientists working 
in academic settings to be deeply interested in my work on the ethics of agricultural bio-
technology, and I have learned a great deal from those individuals who have taken the time 
to read and criticize my work. Nevertheless, as robert Zimdahl’s new book, Agriculture’s 
Ethical Horizon, makes clear, positivist values are still quite prevalent in agricultural sci-
ence departments. Debate, discussion, teaching and thoughtful deliberation on the ethical 
dimensions of agricultural science and technology are still the exception to the rule in 
agricultural universities and government research laboratories (Zimdahl, 006).
as such, I reiterate my claim that technological ethics are better established in private 
industry than in academic science. This is not to say, however, that the mode of practice 
for technological ethics in the biotechnology industry is beyond criticism, nor to imply 
that university-based technological ethics is wholly inferior. In fact, there are interesting 
complementarities between the weaknesses in private-sector technological ethics and the 
strengths of academic approaches. respective weakness and strength in both cases relates 
to the role of scholarship in technological ethics, a practice that currently exists primarily 
in university ethics centers and social science departments, and that is poorly utilized by 
even industry decision makers who are well-motivated and have economic incentives to 
understand the likely impacts of and public receptivity to their technologies. 
toward Partnership in Ethics?
University-based scholarship in technological ethics has two important features not 
typically present in industry settings. One is simply the luxury of expertise. Scholars in 
technological ethics are professionally devoted to understanding the normative, social 
and theoretical issues involved in effectively anticipating and understanding the social, 
economic, cultural and ethical significance of innovation and technical change. They can 
bring a variety of empirical, comparative and analytic methods to this task. Ironically, the 
cultivation of expertise can have unfortunate consequences, as academic scholars come 
to rely on complex and jargon-ridden theoretical models that make it difficult for them 
to extend the fruits of their studies to an audience with more practical and immediate 
concerns in mind. In addition, scholars of technological ethics are always at least one 
step removed from actual decision-making in research and development settings. This 
distance can be the source of many errors and irrelevancies that make this work less useful 
to practical application than it might otherwise be. Nevertheless, I believe that those of 
us who conduct scholarship on technological ethics have learned a few things that would 
be of use in conducting practical ethical inquiries about which technologies to develop 
and what applications of science to pursue.
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One might argue that the findings of the scholarly community are available to industry 
on a consulting basis, and this is true. In point of fact, they are freely available as published 
materials, too, but consulting arrangements may be preferable to decision-makers who 
are already strapped for time. Here, however, the second limitation of industry-based 
technological ethics comes to the fore, and it is a limitation that lies at the very heart of 
the public/private divide. Scholarship on technological ethics is effective to the extent 
that it is public, meaning that it is freely available for peer commentary and critique, but 
also that it both is and is seen as a non-strategic activity aimed solely at disclosing the 
ethics researcher’s best guess at ethically correct standards for development, dissemination, 
adaptation and regulation of new technology. Public criticism and debate over this guess 
is essential to the method, and this criticism must also be motivated solely by the goal of 
agreement on the best and ideally operative standards. 
While private industry can conduct exercises in ethical deliberation under such idealized 
conditions as a practice intended to inform their internal decision-making, there are sound 
business reasons why public disclosure of this process will, on occasion, be constrained 
by considerations of legal and business strategy. Because everyone understands this, state-
ments and disclosures made by private industry are regarded quite properly as strategic, 
as intended to manipulate the reaction and posture of others, rather than as trying to 
articulate the values and reasoning of company decision makers. Only a public activity 
independent of practical decision-making can provide the environment for legitimate 
inquiry into technological ethics.
as such, broad public competence in technological ethics, including familiarity with 
the terms and problems of r&D policy and the socio-cultural significance of technology 
and technical change depends on the existence of a non-strategic body of scholarship. Such 
public competence is needed if we are to realize Jonas’s goal of social decision-making 
on technical means. Given currently existing social institutions, universities remain the 
most likely home for such idealized types of public inquiry, despite the fact that univer-
sity-based scholarship is vulnerable to the distorting influences I have already mentioned. 
More intimate and effective insight into ongoing industry problems and practices would 
clearly strengthen scholarly attempts to understand and respond to technical change. Better 
communication between scholars and practical decision-makers could improve decision-
making. and now it is possible to return at last to the main theme: university/industry 
partnerships, and the development of innovative institutional settings for scientific work 
that bridges commercial and academic cultures. 
We might hope that these new ventures would become laboratories 
for technological ethics, places where the complementary strengths 
of practical ethics as practiced within industry and scholarly ethics 
as practiced within universities might be joined.
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Given what I have said so far, we might hope that these new ventures would become 
laboratories for technological ethics, places where the complementary strengths of practical 
ethics as practiced within industry and scholarly ethics as practiced within universities 
might be joined, or at least might come close enough together for practitioners on both 
sides of the public/private divide to peer over the fence and derive mutual benefit. This 
would indeed be the best of both worlds for technological ethics in university/industry 
partnerships. It will not happen automatically, however, and will require careful thought 
and planning as to how the social science and humanities disciplines so critical to scholar-
ship on technological ethics might be integrated into partnership activities.
What is more likely, I fear, is the opposite result, something more like the worst of both 
worlds. The scientific culture of the academic world that places so little value on reflective 
deliberation into the ethics of science and technology will dominate the partnership. The 
imprimatur of university research will substitute for the exercise of technological ethics 
that currently exists in the private sector, and the industry culture of strategic thinking 
will pick up the ball after key ethical commitments have been thoughtlessly made. The 
result will be a series of technical innovations even less subjected to deliberative ethical 
review and foresight than those of the past. These technologies have the potential to move 
so quickly into development and regulatory review that no one will have any opportunity 
to debate their likely impact or acceptability. What is more, as the public becomes wise 
to the overriding strategic ambitions of these partnerships, the fears of critics who worry 
that industry links will undermine confidence in science will be realized. 
This pessimistic scenario is not the inevitable result of university/industry partnerships, 
and it may not even be the most likely one. What we will probably get is something more 
like the status quo, with university scientists acting more like businessmen, which in this 
case is a good thing because it means that there will be some exercise of ethical foresight. 
researchers such as me, however, will remain on the margins, or more literally back on the 
main campus, where we will spend most of our time talking to one another. While there 
are some more hopeful signs on the horizon—my invitation to speak at this conference 
being one of them—we will have to wait and see what the individuals who execute these 
partnering activities actually do. 
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